Groups such as the Hay?at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Houthi militants, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are dynamic and complex armed organizations. After careful consideration, I have chosen to refer to them as "regional armed organizations" to emphasize their geopolitical significance rather than focusing solely on the organizations themselves. While these groups have existed for years, with numerous names and forms, they are not new. However, the recent developments in Syria present a new challenge within the context of global geopolitics, one that requires a redefined approach to understanding these entities.

The Assad regime has a 50-year history in Syria. It possesses indestructible armored forces, a brutal and ruthless intelligence network, and the support of Russia's air and naval forces. Yet, it was toppled within 24 hours by the regional armed group HTS, with a devastatingly swift force.

To illustrate the point to the stubborn intellectuals with an academic mindset, let me provide another example: the Taliban in Afghanistan. Their actions were nearly identical, as they managed to destroy, overthrow, and overturn a government in Afghanistan in a very short time. That very government was one supported and nurtured by the world's most elite nations. All these took place before the U.S. State Department had a chance to react.

If further examples are needed, there is also Hamas.

Therefore, "regional armed organizations" may not have the historical concept of a nation-state or defined national borders, but they do have controlled territories, popular support, slogans, and a structured, and ideological organization system. Hence, they have the potential to exert significant geopolitical influence in the world.

In a world of spatial fragmentation, the global order needs to be restructured. Countries like the United States, Russia, and China have become relatively insignificant, as their mutual confrontation cancels each other out, ultimately leading to a situation where neither side emerges victorious. However, the depletion and contraction caused by their standoff have created vast new spaces in the world, providing conditions for the existence and proliferation of regional armed organizations.

It will not be long before the major global powers that recognize this trend will understand that leveraging regional armed organizations is key to achieving geopolitical success. For example, Iran has the Houthi militants as a regional armed group in the Red Sea; Turkey has its own regional armed organization; the United States supports Kurdish forces as a regional armed group along Turkey’s border; and even China has its own similar organizations.

The future world will be about how to use these regional armed organizations in conflict. Major powers are locked in a standoff, unable to take significant action, while it is these regional armed organizations that are capable of creating turbulence and upheaval on the global stage. They are actively operating, being utilized, supported, disappearing, and succeeding. Geopolitics in the next 30 years will depend on which country can best leverage such organizations.

This certainly requires the collaboration of intelligence experts and theorists, but it also requires a large number of "lone wolves", these Seedfolks, who, like flying sparks, can create more regional armed organizations in regions of turmoil around the world, igniting existing conflicts and discontent. They will be able to achieve geopolitical victories that even major powers like the United States have been unable to secure over the past 80 years, such as the success of the Abu Mohammad al-Julani in Syria or the Houthi militants in Yemen. In fact, they are more effective than people might imagine.

Global geopolitics is increasingly deviating from the path of major powers and shifting toward the marginals. Regional armed organizations are set to become even more important geopolitical tools than nuclear weapons, and Israel is likely to make use of them, the same is true for Russia. Yet, the United States and China are not yet positioned to do so, as one is constrained by outdated academic thinking, while the other is limited by domestic politics.